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Abstract— This paper introduces a design approach based on 
system analysis and game theory for the identification of 
architectural equilibrium which guarantees the stability of the 
system being designed and its environment after the integration. 
We introduce multi-objective optimization and game theory, and 
their links with systems engineering through mathematical 
models. While Pareto optimality is used to select best 
architectures and to support independent decisions, Nash 
equilibrium is used to find out architectural equilibrium and to 
support interdependent decisions. This approach was illustrated 
previously in a case study. 
Keywords—Architectural equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; 
Stable systems. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The integration of a new system in an environment can 
disrupt the stability of this environment and trigger adverse or 
unexpected events, which in turn can affect the success of this 
integration. This integration becomes more complex due to the 
complexity of the system of interest (SOI) and its environment. 
To address this problem, we propose in this paper a design 
approach based on system analysis and game theory for the 
identification of architectural equilibrium which guarantees the 
stability of the SOI and its environment after the integration. 
We have demonstrated this assertion using a practical example 
related to electric vehicles  [1] [2]. We rely on a system analysis 
to understanding the system environment and the stakeholders 
involved during the SOI`s life cycle. The objective is to find 
global balances between external systems (stakeholders) that 
would meet their needs (would satisfy their strategies), taking 
into account feasibility constraints (economic, technological, 
regulatory, societal, etc.) This balance (equilibrium) guarantees 
a better integration of the SOI and the stability of its 
environment. In order to find this equilibrium, we create a 
game model as defined in game theory. Solving this game and 
finding equilibrium allow to anticipate changes in an uncertain 
environment (departure or arrival of a stakeholder, new or 
changing needs or constraints, etc.) 
A game as defined in game theory is a mathematical 
function which matches for each possible combination of 
strategies played by N players, an outcome of the game. This 
outcome is often represented - especially in numerical 
examples - by the gain of each player  [3]. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Games could be used to solve many multi-objective 
optimization (MOO) problems. MOO in the context of 
engineering and design of complex systems is very useful to 
support tradeoff analysis and decision making. It allows 
considering multidisciplinary objectives such as performance, 
cost, schedule and risk (cf. Maier and Rechtin, 2000  [4]). A 
quick overview of MOO and the most popular methods are 
presented in  [4]. 
A MOO problem can be formalized mathematically as 
follows  [5]:  
We look at Minimizing F(x)=[F1(x), F2(x),…,Fk(x)]
T 
 
while gj(x) ≤ 0, j=1,2,…,m.  and  hi(x) =0, i=1,2, ….,e 
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k is the number of objective functions 
m is the number of inequality constraints 
e is the number of equality constraints 
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The feasible decision space X is defined as a set {x|gj(x) ≤0, 
j=1,2,…,m ; and hi(x)=0, i=1,2,…,e}.  
The feasible objective space Z is defined as a set {F(x)|x X}.  
 
The notion of preference of decision-makers and priority 
between optimization objectives influence the choice of 
methods for solving an MOO problem. The author  [4], for 
example, class examples into two categories: methods with 
expression of preferences in advance (a priori preferences) and 
the Pareto methods (a posteriori preferences). The reader may 
refer to the studies on MOO methods in  [6],  [7] and  [8] for 
further references. 
Indeed, in an MOO problem, there is no single and unique 
global solution, it is often necessary to identify a set of optimal 
points. The predominant concept in defining an optimal point is 
Pareto optimality  [5]. This is the mathematical definition of a 
Pareto point: 
A point x* X is a Pareto optimum if, and only if, there is 
not another point x X such as F(x)≤F(x*) and Fi(x)<Fi(x*) 
for at least one function. The Pareto optimal points represent 
the boundary of the space of feasible objectives Z which is 
called the Pareto frontier. 
The solutions which are not Pareto optimal while they meet 
other constraints are called Weakly Pareto Optimal. A point x*
X is a Weakly Pareto optimum if, and only if, there is not 
another point x X such as F(x)≤F(x*).  
In other words, a point is a Weakly Pareto Optimal if there 
is not another point that enhances all objective functions 
simultaneously. A point is a Pareto optimum if there is not 
another point that improves at least one objective function at 
the expense of another objective function. 
However, the preferences of decision makers are difficult to 
quantify and depend on several parameters within the 
organizations. Some decision problems in the context of 
systems engineering can be seen as decision problems of a 
single agent (one independent decision maker), but, in practice, 
many interdependent stakeholders around the SOI (architects, 
engineers, managers, project managers, program managers. 
etc.) may have different preferences difficult to quantify and 
often difficult to converge  [9]. In addition, when designing a 
system where many external stakeholders are involved, and are 
expecting some added value, the decisions become 
interdependent. Thus, we discuss in the following paragraphs 
the contribution of game theory and Nash equilibrium in 
addressing such problems. 
III. WHY GAME THEORY 
Game theory is a rational decision theory of strategically 
interdependent agents, that is to say, which influence each 
other and are aware of these reciprocal influences. The games 
are interactive decision situations in which utility (welfare) of 
each individual depends on the decisions of other individuals 
 [10]. 
A. Definitions 
Some definitions in this section are adapted from  [3]. The 
ingredients of a game are a list of n individuals called players, 
aiming to maximize an objective function or quantified gains, 
given the information they have (rationality conditions of the 
players, a rational player is the one who wants maximum 
gains). We then have n sets, one set by a player, whose 
elements are called strategies. In addition, we have a 
mathematical function which matches to each of the possible 
combinations of strategies available to N players an outcome of 
the game. This outcome is often represented - especially in the 
numerical examples – by the gain of each player. Indeed, a 
solution of the game is a combination of strategies, and the 
associated gains for each player accordingly. 
Formally, we have a game with n players. Each player i 
has a set Si of strategies. s=(s1,…,sn) is a combination of 
strategic choices of n players where s1 is the strategic choice 
of the player 1, s2 is the strategic choice of the player 2 and so 
on. П = (П1,…,Пn) is the result of the game where Пi(s1,…,sn) 
is the gain of the player i when s is selected, where i can be 
any player i =1,2,…,n.  
 
The strategies can be pure strategies (no probability) or 
mixed strategies (for a given pure strategy s1, we associate a 
probability p1). The solution of the game with mixed strategies 
may not be in the real world, we can imagine a real number 
(float) to quantify the gain (even if it does not exist in reality). 
The criterion for comparing the gains in the various possible 
alternatives is that of expected utility, which is to take the 
expected gains of pure-strategies obtained by weighting them 
by the probabilities chosen by the players (their mixed 
strategies). 
We can have a complete information game (each player 
knows all the possible outcomes of the game and the strategies 
of the other players) and an incomplete information game 
(players assign a priori probabilities on the outcomes of the 
game and the strategies of the other players). The game can be 
zero-sum when the sum of gains of all players is zero. A non-
zero sum game can be reduced to a zero-sum game by creating 
a fictitious player. 
Unlike a non-cooperative game, in a cooperative game the 
players can create coalitions (agreements on the choice of 
strategies to play.) A dominant strategy of a player exists if he 
has a strategy that gives him the maximum gains whatever the 
strategies of the other players. 
Finally, we talk about an equilibrium (a point of rest, which 
may be the end point of a process) when the players announce 
their choices and no one regrets his choice given the choices of 
the other players. The Nash equilibrium is an example. If all 
strategies is finite (bounded) and the game can include mixed 
strategies, then the game has at least one Nash equilibrium 
solution. 
B. Nash Equilibrium 
Nash equilibrium is a very important concept in game 
theory (name of John F. Nash, Nobel Prize in Economics in 
1994. He introduced the concept of equilibrium in 1951). Nash 
equilibrium describes an outcome of the game in which no 
player has an incentive to change his strategy given the 
strategies of the other players. The formal description of Nash 
equilibrium can be given as follows  [11]: 
Let`s define a no-cooperative game with n player and 
s*=(s*1,…,s*n) a combination of strategic choices of these n 
players where s*1 is the strategic choice of the player 1, s*2 is 
the strategic choice of the player 2 and so on. In addition, let  
Пi(s*1,…,s*n) the gain of the player i when s* is selected, 
where i can be any player i =1,2,…,n. 
 
Nash Equilibrium is formally defined as follows: 
 
A combination of strategic choices s*=(s*1,…,s*n) is a 
Nash equilibrium if  
Пi(s*1,…,s*i,…,s*n) ≥ Пi(s*1,…,si,…,s*n) for each si in Si 
and each player i. Si is the set of strategies of the player i. 
 
In summary, s*i is the best strategy of player i when all the 
other players choose their strategies s*. 
 
In this work, we are interested in studying non-cooperative 
games (the players cannot talk to each other and sign 
preferential contracts (particularly because of anti-trust laws 
prohibiting businesses to communicate with each other to enter 
into agreements, etc.  [11] )) 
C. Link with systems engineering 
As explained previously, one of the first stages of a systems 
engineering approach is the modeling of the SOI`s 
environment. The purpose of this step is to define the 
interactions between the SOI with the external systems with 
which it interacts in order to anticipate the evolution of an 
external system (or several) that could affect other systems. 
This step clarifies the external interfaces of the SOI before 
diving in optimizing its internal architectures. Note that the 
environment modeling phase is critical. Forgetting an external 
system could jeopardize the design of the SOI. Indeed, each 
external system has its own expectations, needs or constraints, 
throughout the life cycle of the system, the designer should 
anticipate and satisfy. However, these needs are often 
interrelated and sometimes antagonistic. In order to maximize 
the profits related to the SOI, each stakeholder has strategies. 
Thus, we arrive at a situation where the designer must look for 
equilibrium for the purpose of stability. This architectural 
equilibrium should more or less satisfy all these stakeholders 
and ensure a stable environment throughout the SOI's life 
cycle. 
By taking the vocabulary of the systems engineering and 
game theory, we assume that each stakeholder can be 
considered as a player around the SOI and he is rational. Each 
player has his own strategies to maximize his gains, which 
account for the satisfaction of his own needs. However, the 
designer must try to best satisfy the stakeholders (players). At 
the same time, the designer should find out an architectural 
equilibrium, meaning that it guarantees the stability of the 
environment throughout the cycle life of the SOI and the life 
cycles of all the stakeholders. Finally, we can say that the pre-
design of this architectural equilibrium is a solution of a game 
where the stakeholders are the players. If we consider that the 
stakeholders can build coalitions in the sense that they combine 
their choice of strategies, it is called cooperative game. 
Otherwise, it is in a non-cooperative game. 
The use of game theory in the context of systems 
engineering and its relation to design architectural frameworks 
is mentioned in  [12]. Indeed, the authors propose a framework 
called Engineering Systems Multiple-Domain Matrix (ES-
MDM). The framework is based on the use of several different 
areas (environmental, social, functional, technical, process) and 
matrices (designer / decision maker, stakeholder, objectives, 
functions, objects, activities). Then the authors propose to cross 
the matrices together and in different areas, for example, the 
stakeholder matrix about a SOI representing the social field, 
Stakeholders are human entities that contribute to the 
objectives of the system and control system components. The 
extent of their control system defines the scope of the system. 
For the identification of stakeholders in a given system, it is 
useful to ask the following questions (cf. Rechtin and Maier 
(2000) in  [12]): Who benefits? Who pays? Who supplies? And 
who loses? Then, the authors propose a combination of 
matrices, such as that of stakeholders with those goals. Each 
stakeholder has his own objectives, and other stakeholders can 
declare their support, opposition or indifference. This is used to 
store information about the positions of the various 
stakeholders that can be used in a game model to analyze 
strategies and to align their interests (cf. Dixit and Skeath 
(2003) in  [12]) on a tutorial on game theory and applications in 
the real world.) 
D. Proposed approach 
In our approach, we propose the following interdependence 
analysis process to identify an architectural equilibrium: 
1. Analysis and modeling of the SOI`s environment 
2. Stakeholders identification 
3. Macro-needs analysis and identification of strategies 
(for each stakeholder) 
4. Identification of the interdependence between strategies, 
so between stakeholders 
5. SOI Total Cost of Ownership calculation and life-cycle 
assessment 
6. Realization of a distribution matrix - normal or 
extensive form of the game – according to the 
combination of strategies 
7. Setting examples of distribution scenarios 
8. Equilibrium calculation 
9. If cooperation is possible, create coalitions of 
stakeholders, and go to 7 
10. Emphasize the equilibrium solutions. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
One difficulty in finding an architectural equilibrium is that 
it is not easy to empirically observe the emergence of behavior 
consistent with a mixed strategy. Indeed, in that case, there is 
no strict incentive that an actor plays the equilibrium strategy, 
the use of random strategies implies the use of assumptions on 
the expected utility and assumptions of risk  [10]. Another 
difficulty in solving games is related to the fact that the 
information can be complete or incomplete. It is not easy for a 
player to know all the strategies of other players without 
contracts for cooperation. In addition, sometimes, it is very 
difficult to formalize gains functions (we can even be in front 
of non-formalized gains, such as brand image where the notion 
of perception is important, etc.) We can also consider the 
emergence of new issues that brings us clearly in decisions in 
uncertain situations. However, building such models helps 
greatly in finding architectural equilibriums, or at least 
approaching them. The example we presented in  [1] related to 
electric vehicles is instructive. 
Indeed, to designing complex industrial system, we believe 
that two types of optimization models are complementary and 
necessary. These models take into account the types of 
decisions that come into play in the choice of solutions. 
Pareto Optimality for finding the best architectural 
solutions of an SOI given the needs and constraints of the 
stakeholders / external systems. These solutions correspond to 
different options or alternatives of the system architectures. 
Pareto Optimality is useful for "independent" decisions in the 
sense that these decisions depend only on the choices (or 
preferences) as defined by the SOI designer. The decision 
space related to these decisions is a set of endogenous factors. 
Nash equilibrium for finding the best equilibrium 
between the stakeholders surrounding the SOI. The results 
correspond to different architectural equilibrium. The 
equilibrium models are useful for "interdependent" decisions, 
where the decision space contains endogenous and exogenous 
factors, which depend not only on the SOI designer, but also on 
other stakeholders. 
Finally, we can consider that architectural equilibrium of a 
given system has an impact on the design, therefore on the 
independent decisions. The architectural equilibrium gives the 
first orientations that are made during the design process. Some 
preliminary design constraints result from the choice of the 
architectural equilibrium. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present the contribution of game theory in 
finding architectural equilibrium, in the context of complex 
systems engineering. Indeed, for interdependent decisions of 
different stakeholders involved during the lifecycle of a given 
system, the concept of equilibrium is important. An 
architectural equilibrium of the SOI guarantees a better 
integration, stability of its environment and the satisfaction of 
all the stakeholders. This assertion is shown by a practical 
example related to the market of electric vehicles in  [1] [2]. 
Many factors may contribute to the success of electric vehicles, 
which do not necessarily depend on the car manufacturers but 
also on other stakeholders such as energy suppliers, local 
authorities, governments, etc.  
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